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THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT AND OSHA's
HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD
American corporations use over 575,000 hazardous substances in their
daily operations, t posing significant health risks to employees and the
surrounding community.2 The federal government has acknowledged
the rights of both employees and the public to obtain information regard-
ing toxic chemicals. Federal law, however, regulates worker and com-
munity right-to-know separately. In 1984, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), acting pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the OSH Act),3 promulgated the Hazard
Communication Standard (the OSHA Standard) to govern hazardous
substance communication to workers.4 Initially, the OSHA Standard
protected only employees in the manufacturing sector;5 OSHA amended
the standard in 1987 to cover all employees.6 In 1986, Congress enacted
1. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,852 (1987). 86,000 trade name products comprise 70% of recorded
exposure to hazardous chemicals. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEAtTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DHEW, Pub. No. 78-1 14,
NATIONASL OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD SURVEY 7 (1977). For a detailed discussion of the categories
of hazardous chemicals, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
2. A recent study indicates that approximately 59% of American workers are exposed to dan-
gerous chemicals for at least four hours each working day. Oleinick, Fodor, & Susselman, Risk
Management for Hazardous Chemicals: Adverse Health Consequences of Their Use and the Limnita-
tions of Traditional Control Standards, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 9, 18 n.33 (1988) [hereinafter Risk
Management I]. An estimated 97 of 100.000 workers experience acute disabling illness or injury due
to hazardous chemical exposure. Id. at 14 (Table 2). The study concludes that worker morbidity
and mortality caused by hazardous chemicals is significant. Id. at 102.
Causation is a significant problem in determining the risks attendant to hazardous substances.
Many effects of hazardous chemical exposure occur with similar frequency in the general public,
making causality difficult to establish See id. (giving the example of lung disease). In fact, most
physician% have difficulty diagnosing an illness or injury as occupational in origin. See Risk Manage-
ment 1, %upra, at 22 n.37. Moreover, little or no data exists concerning the health effects of some
chemicals. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (Appendix A) (1988). The OSHA Standard's definition of
"health hazard" ignores direct causation, requiring only that effects "'may occur in exposed employ-
ees." Id See infra note 44.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)).
4. OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). See Miller, The
Occupaitonal Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTIP. PROBS. 612,
616 (1974) for a synopsis of employees' common-law rights to a safe workplace.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1984). The manufacturing sector includes all employers in Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 20 through 39. See infra note 42. For a discussion of the
OSHA Standard as originally enacted, see infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b), (c) (1988). See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
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the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EP-
CRA), which requires employers to disclose hazardous substance infor-
mation to local public protection agencies and the community.7
State and municipal right-to-know laws coexist with the federal hazard
communication scheme.' Many of these laws impose different or stricter
7. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-50 (Supp.
V 1987). Congress enacted EPCRA as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 300-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (1986) (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and titles 10, 29, 33, and 42 of U.S.C.). Although the amendments
fall within the regulatory scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987), EPCRA is independent of
CERCLA.
8. The following is a summary of state worker and/or community right-to-know laws and
regulations: ALA. CODE §§ 22-33-I to -15 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.60.030, 18.60.065-
.068, 18.60.075, 18.60.105, 18.70.310, 29.35.500-.590 (1986); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8,
§§ 61.010-.960 (Oct. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-341 (1986); 1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
558 (Deering); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25,500-25,541 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. LAn.
CODE §§ 6360-6399.5 (West 1989); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 5194 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-307a, 31-40a to -40p (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 16, §§ 2401-2417
(Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.101-.127 (West Supp. 1989); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
38F-41.01 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-22-1 to -12 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 396-7
(1985); HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 12-203-1, -202-8 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1401-1420 (1986
& Supp. 1989); id. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.14,1003.48, 1004,1007, 1007.1-.2, 1025b-1 to b-5 (1988 &
Supp. 1989); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 205.20 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-8-1.1-1 to -7
(Burns 1986); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 620, r. 1-1-1 to -27 (1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 89B.12-.17
(West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5701 (Supp. 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.800-
.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); id. §§ 338.011-.991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp.
1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2361 (WEST 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1696-A to -F
(Supp. 1988); id. tit. 26, §§ 1709-1725 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 32A-320 (1986); MD.
ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 6-501 to -504 (1987 & Supp. 1989); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 9, § 12.33.01
(1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IlIF, §§ 1-21 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); MASS. REGS. CODE
tit. 105, § 670.001 (1984); id. tit. 441, § 21.01 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.1005, .1011,
.1014, .1014a-m, .1031, .1063 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 182.65-.675 (West
Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 292.600-.620 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-78-101 to -402
(1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 618.365-.395 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 277-A:l to :10 (1987);
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. [Lab.] 1403.33 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to -31 (West
1988); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ IG-1.1 to -7.10 (Supp. 1984 & 1988); id. tit. 8, §§ 59-1.1 to -10.3
(Supp. 1984 & 1986); N.M. STAr. ANN. §§ 50-9-1 to -25 (1978 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§§ 875-883 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 72.1-.6 (1982); id. tit. 12,
§§ 800.1-.4 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-173 to -218 (1988); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, r.
7c.0101(a)(99) (June 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 18-01-34, 65-14-01 to -05 (Supp. 1989); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3716.01-.99 (Page 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 401-424 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. ch. 453.307-.372 (1987); id. ch. 654.194-.196 (1989); OR. ADMIN. R.
437-155-001 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon Supp. 1989): R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 23-24.4-1 to -9, 28-21-1 to -16 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-15-80 to -100, -210 (Law. Co-op.
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-3-2001 to -2019 (Supp. 1989); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 6, cli.
0800-1-1 to -9 (1986); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5182b, §§ 1-19 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989);
TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, §§ 295.1-.9 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-1 to -22 (1988 & Supp.
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obligations on employers than federal law.9 Some states, however, do not
distinguish between employee and community right-to-know as the fed-
eral scheme does. In fact, in several states, one law may regulate both
employee and community hazard communication.10
The impact of the federal structure on state and local laws is not en-
tirely clear. While the OSHA Standard purports to preempt all em-
ployee right-to-know laws,I l EPCRA expressly does not preempt or
1984): id. §§ 63-5-5, -6 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1721-1731 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 40.1-51, -51.1, -51.2, -51.4:1 (1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.70.010-.905 (Supp. 1989); W.
V %. CODL §§ 16-31-I. 21-3-18 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.58-.599 (West 1988); Wis. ADMIN.
COD- § [ILHR] 101.58 (Nov. 1986); WYO. STAT. §§ 27-11-101 to -114 (1987).
In addition to state laws, local ordinances regulate hazard communication in several states, in-
cluding Alaska, California, Connecticut. Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
Six states and the District of Columbia have neither employee nor community right-to-know legis-
lation: Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Mississippi, Nebraska, and South Dakota.
T hree states have no employee right-to-know provisions: Kansas, Missouri, and Ohio. Nine states
do not regulate community right-to-know: Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming. In addition, the Alabama state legislature has
refused to enact funding measures for the enforcement of its community right-to-know provisions.
For information concerning a particular right-to-know law, see Susser, The OSHA Standard and
State "Right-to-Know' Laws: The Preemption Battle Continues, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 615 (1985)
(Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania); Note, Employee Right to Know: Should the
Federal Government or the States Regulate the Dissemination of Hazardous Substance Information to
Protect Employee Health and Safety?. 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 633 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Em-
plovee Right to Know] (Massachusetts), Note, The Right to Know: Does OSHA's Toxic Hazard Com-
munication Rule Preempt State Statutes Requiring Public Disclosure of Workplace Toxics?, 62 U.
DLIi L REV. 463, 476-80 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Right to Know] (comparison of New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Michigan right-to-know statutes).
The number of right-to-know laws has increased annually since 1980: four in 1980, two in 1981,
eight in 1983, fourteen in 1984, twenty-two in 1985, and three in 1986. See Risk Management 1,
5upra note 2. at 5 n.8.
q Almost every state law contains requirements supplemental to or different from the federal
scheme, particularly concerning worker right-to-know. For example, several states use hazardous
substance lists compiled by state agencies: Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and New Hampshire.
In addition, the federally required material safety data sheet may not satisfy the requirements under
a few states' laws: Alabama. Florida, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont. At least three
states require the labeling of substances shipped into the state: Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. See mupra note 8. For a summary of state right-to-know requirements, see Chart of
State Commnunity Right-To-Know Requirements, [Tab 800] COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW MAN-
t xl (Thompson Publ, Group. Inc.) 4 820, at 21-29 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter MANUAL]; Chart of
State Title III Programs, [Tab 800] MANUAL 821, at 31-35 (Mar., Apr. 1989); Chart of State
WrAer Right-To-Know Requirements. [Tab 800] MANUAL ", 822, at 41-51 (Dec. 1988).
10 Alabama. Delaware. Florida, Louisiana, Maine. Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey.
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas have combined employee and community right-to-know laws.
in addition, the Illinois, Iowa. Massachusetts, and Rhode Island community and worker right-to-
know laws contain interdependent requirements. See supra note 8.
11 29 C.F.R § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988). See infra notes 50-51, 115 and accompanying text. 29
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otherwise affect state or local community right-to-know legislation.' 2
Before the enactment of EPCRA and the amendment of the OSHA Stan-
dard, courts held that the OSHA Standard partially preempted combined
right-to-know laws. 13 Two preemption analyses developed. The Third
Circuit employed a "primary purpose" test, under which the OSHA
Standard preempted only provisions for which the state asserted an em-
ployee protection purpose, as opposed to a public safety purpose.' 4 The
Sixth Circuit, cognizant of the laws' dual nature, instead deferred almost
entirely to OSHA's determination of the standard's preemptive scope.'5
Because federal preemption presents a question of congressional in-
tent,'6 EPCRA and the amended OSHA Standard play important roles
in preemption analysis. This Note examines the extent to which OSHA's
Hazard Communication Standard preempts state and local, right-to-
know laws in light of this recent federal action. Part I reviews the status
of the preemption issue prior to the enactment of EPCRA and the
amendment of the OSHA Standard. Part II interprets these changes in
the federal scheme in light of congressional intent. Part III analyzes the
ramifications of EPCRA and the OSHA Standard's amendment on the
federal preemption question.
I. PREEMPTION BACKGROUND
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine
The federal preemption doctrine originates from the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, which provides that federal laws en-
acted within the scope of Congress' powers supersede state laws.' 7 Be-
U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982) authorizes OSHA to preempt state and local law. See hifra note 31 and
accompanying text.
12. EPCRA § 321(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11,041(a) (Supp. V 1987). See itfra note 138 and accompa-
nying text.
13. See infra notes 59-107 and accompanying text.
14. See New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985), hifra
notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
15. See Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron. 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986), appeal dismissed, 108
S. Ct. 44 (1987); infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. In each of the three methods by which Con-
gress preempts state laws, see infra note 22, the ultimate determination hinges on congressional
intent.
17. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/4
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cause legislative intent is the "touchstone" of federal preemption,18
preemption analysis requires judicial inquiry of congressional intent19
and state legislative purpose.2" The factual nature of this inquiry war-
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
I As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone"
for preemption analysis. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
19. Courts will not readily infer that Congress intended to preempt state law. In fact, preemp-
tion analysis "starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."
Penn Terra Ltd. v, Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272-73 (3d Cir. 1984).
If Congress intends to preempt state law, it must clearly indicate this intention. See California
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
746 (1081); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47, reh'g denied, 374 U.S.
858 (1963) (unambiguous); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (clear and
manifest); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.4, at 298 (3d ed.
1986). But see Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and State Police Powers
1922-27, 12 MINN. L. REV. 321, 327 (1928) (court, not Congress, is actually "doing the intending");
Note, Federal Pre-emption: Time to Reestablish an Old Doctrine, 12 NOVA L.J. 1331, 1339 (1988)
[hereinafter Note, Federal Pre-emption] (Supreme Court abandoned clear intent requirement in
1941): Note, Pre-emption as a Pre-ferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L.
REv' 208, 210 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Preferential Ground] (most courts give "lip service" to in-
tent inquiry). One commentator suggests that the Court's reluctance to infer federal preemption is
unnecessary because the federal process adequately protects state sovereignty. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988).
20. If federal and state objectives coincide, state law must yield to federal law. See Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (federal law preempts
state law with identical purpose): Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983) (necessary for court to determine whether state law has
rationale other than federal purpose); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978) (fed-
eral law does not preempt state laws "having other purposes"); Note, The Right to Know, supra note
8, at 487-88. But see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142 (state objectives irrelevant);
Tyson. The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard on State and Commu-
nityr Right to Know Laws, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1010, 1018 (1987) (practical impact, not pur-
pose, of state law should be controlling).
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that an inquiry of state purpose is inappropriate for
certain lines of preemption analysis. See. e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 216 n.28 (distinguish-
ing Perez) (purpose inquiry inapposite in actual conflict cases); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651
(1971) (state purpose analysis is "'aberrational doctrine"-state law preempted on actual conflict
grounds regardless of its purpose).
Because the inquiry into actual state legislative intent is an "unsatisfactory venture," the Court
has shown great willingness to accept a state'% asserted purpose as the motivation behind state law.
See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 216 (accepted asserted purpose of utility regulation as opposed to
nuclear safety): New York Tel. Co v New York Labor Dep't, 440 U.S. 519. 533 (1979) (accepted
avowed purpose of securing employment rather than regulating collective bargaining).
Combined with this convoluted doctrine is a presumption against federal preemption of laws
whose purpose lies within the state's traditional police power. See Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707. 715 (1985) (blood plasma); Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 206
(clcctrical utilities): McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (family law); Ray v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co.. 435 U.S. 151. 164 (1978) (vessel safety); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.. 430 U.S. 519. 525.
(food labeling), reh~gdenied. 431 U.S. 925 (1977): Florida Line & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 144-
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rants a case-by-case approach to the federal preemption issue.2
A federal statute may preempt state and local laws in one of three
ways.2 2 First, express preemption arises when Congress states its intent
to preempt state law on the face of a federal act.2 3 Second, absent such
explicit language, a federal statutory scheme may be so comprehensive as
to permit an inference that Congress intended to foreclose state participa-
46 (avocado marketing law); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (utilities); H.
P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) (safety regulation); L. TRIBE, supra note 19,
§ 6-26, at 489; NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 19, § 9.3, at 297; Tyson, supra, at 1017;
Note, The Extent of OSHA Preemption of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 630, 646 (1988) [hereinafter Note, OSHA Preemption] (great deference to state police powers).
Cf Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251, 253-55; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (preempting state
regulation in field of alien registration). But see Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)
(state community property law preempted).
21. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 19, § 9.1, at 296, § 9.2, at 297 (case-by-case
approach; ad hoe balancing); Tyson, supra note 20, at 1023 (facts and court's philosophy); Note,
OSHA Preemption, supra note 20, at 645; Note, Federal Pre-emption, supra note 19, at 1335.
22. The Supreme Court explained the ways in which federal law preempts state and local law:
It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state author-
ity by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent
to supersede state law altogether may be found from a "'scheme of federal regulation ...
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it,' because the Act 'of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject,' or because 'the object sought to be obtained by the federal
law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.'" Even
where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises
when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," or
where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983) (citations omitted).
23. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Courts
generally defer to an express preemption provision contained in a federal law. See California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusal to look beyond
statutory preemption clause); Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983) (plain
language controls); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 539, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977);
L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-26, at 483 n.8 (beyond judicial authority to ignore preemption clause);
Tyson, supra note 20, at 1023 (language of federal Act dispositive). Cf Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463
U.S. 85 (1983) (threshold determination of whether provision covers particular state law). But see
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 283-85 (resorting to legislative history and historical context to determine con-
gressional intent); Note, Preferential Ground, supra note 19, at 211, 215 (preemption clause begs the
question and is not solely determinative).
A generally recognized principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous language controls.
At least one commentator, however, has suggested that this presumption applies only to specific
preemption language. See Note, The Right to Know, supra note 8, at 493 (no deference to general
preemption provisions).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/4
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tion.2 4 Third, when neither of these factors is present, but state and fed-
eral laws conflict, a court will find implied preemption.25 A state statute
will be implicitly preempted if it renders compliance with a federal law
impossible 21 or stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of federal
objectives.27
24 The pervasiveness of a federal scheme signals that Congress contemplated preemption of
state law. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 469 (1984); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-27, at 498. Federal
occupation of a portion of a regulatory field may produce the same preemption analysis. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (federal
occupation of field of nuclear safety, rather than entire field of nuclear regulation).
An accepted test for federal occupation of the field is whether "the matter on which the State
asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act." Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S, at 236. If the subject of regulation is particularly national in character, the Court may be more
willing to find federal dominion. See. e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (alien regis-
tration closely connected with national foreign policy powers). But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 355 (1976) (not all state laws regulating aliens are preempted).
The Supreme Court also has recognized a regulatory field in which it was "inconceivable that
Congress would have left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress in-
tended the States to continue" to regulate in the area. Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 207-08
(federal regulation of nuclear safety does not constitute occupation of field of economic utility regu-
lation), Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (no federal occupation of
avocado marketing field), reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963). Conversely, Congress may choose not
to regulate in a particular field, intentionally leaving a regulatory vacuum. If enunciated clearly, this
decision equally would preempt state and local laws. Cf Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas
Pub. Sers'. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983) (dictum) (federal decision to forego regulation in given
area may imply "authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated").
25 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132
(1913), Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912). Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-25, at 481 n.14
(federal preemption when state and federal laws conflict).
26. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (state law requiring judicial review in-
consistent with Federal Arbitration Act), Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 (compliance with state law regarding avocado
oil content and federal law regulating size, weight and date not impossible); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962) (state law designating different beneficiary from federal law preempted).
27 The Supreme Court has stated that federal law preempts state law to the extent the state
law is an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Accord Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S 238, 248 (1984); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
Mere discouragement of state regulation may be insufficient to establish preemption. The
Supreme Court has imposed a limit on federal purpose, declaring it "not to be accomplished at all
costs" Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 222 (state moratorium on nuclear power plants does not
frustrate federal goal of promoting nuclear power). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-26, at 482-
83 (state discouragement of federally encouraged conduct obstructs federal purpose). According to
one commentator, federal law preempts state laws conflicting with either the narrow purpose of a
federal statute or its broader, more abstract goals. Id. § 6-26, at 485.
When Congress attempts to establish national uniformity, a finding of preemption of different state
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When Congress delegates authority to a federal agency to promulgate
regulations, the regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal
law.28 As long as administrative preemption falls within the scope of
statutory authority to preempt, the agency's determination merits judi-
cial deference.29 Thus, the intent of the appropriate administrative
agency is relevant in determining the preemptive scope of federal
regulations.
B. OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard
In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources."3 OSHA, the agency created by the act, received authority to
laws usually follows. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (Ports and Water-
ways Act established uniform federal standard); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (federal
uniformity in food labeling), reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 19,
§ 6-26, at 486 (implied preemption of state laws undermining federal uniformity policy); NOWAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 19, § 9.4, at 299. If Congress, on the other hand, intended only to
create a regulatory floor, stricter state laws are free from preemption. See Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (because Congress did not intend uniformity, federal
blood donation regulations only set floor for state regulation).
28. See City of New York v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 486 U.S. 57 (1988); Hillsbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) ("Federal regulations have no less preemptive
effect than federal statutes"); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)
(National Labor Relations Board); L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-26, at 481.
29. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54 (administrator's exercise of discretion "subject to judi-
cial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily");
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 19, § 9.4, at 299 n.5 (deference unless Congress clearly
would not have sanctioned preemption); Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 408 (1986) (administrative agency has superior expertise, in-
formation, political accountability, and express congressional mandate); id. at 409 (strong presump-
tion against preemption if agency is silent); Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative
Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985) (delegation by Congress is basis of administrative deference); Note,
Preferential Ground, supra note 19, at 211 (scope of agency preemption dependent on policy and
authority of Act). Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-28, at 502 n.I (court must decide whether Con-
gress clearly delegated preemption issue to agency); id. (agency presence not determinative of con-
flict or occupation of the field analysis). But see Tyson, supra note 20, at 1016 (no deference to
preemption determination; courts should apply own analysis); Note, OSHA Preemption, supra note
20, at 638 (deferring to administrative determination permits agency to define scope of its own
authority).
30. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). Congress also
explained the several means by which it sought to achieve these goals. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1)-(13)
(1982). The legislative history of the Ad contains only one reference to community health and
safety. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5180.
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promulgate regulations and standards thereunder.3' Congress expressly
preserved state laws "relating to an occupational safety or health issue
with respect to which no standard is in effect." 32 The corollary of this
proviso suggests that duly promulgated OSHA standards preempt state
laws." Conversely, the provision's language demonstrates that Congress
did not intend to occupy the entire field of occupational safety and
health.34 Rather, Congress provided that standards preempt state law
31 Section 655(b) of the OSH Act provides that "[t]he Secretary [of Labor] may by rule pro-
mulgate . any occupational safety or health standard .... 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1982). While the
provision regarding promulgation of new standards is permissive, the act requires the Secretary to
promulgate any national consensus standards and any established federal standards deemed helpful.
29 US.C. § 655(a) (1982). See id. § 652(9), (10). Congress explained that "authorizing the Secre-
tary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards" would further Congress'
stated purposes. Id. § 651(b)(3) (1982).
The OSH Act defines "occupational safety and health standard" as "a standard which requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment." Id. § 652(8).
Unlike a regulation, which targets general health and safety problems, a standard must be "rea-
sonably necessary" to reduce a "significant risk of harm" to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982).
See also id. § 655(b)(5) (standard "based upon research, demonstrations, experiments" and other
appropriate information). See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607.
614-15, 639 (1980).
32 Congress expressly intended that "[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency
or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1982).
States may regulate an area "relating to any occupational safety and health issue" only upon ap-
proval of the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 667(b). See infra note 36.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) also contains the phrase "relating to" in
its preemption clause. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). ERISA preempts state laws to the extent
that they "relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. § 1144(a). Courts have interpreted this lan-
guage as representing a broad preemptive scope. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983):
American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran. 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1983); Bu-
czynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1250 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nora. Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-25 (1981).
33 The OSH Act's preemption provision is phrased in the negative. It preserves state laws
only if no standard is in effect. The necessary implication is that no state may assert jurisdiction if a
standard is in effect. OSHA's regulations, on the other hand, have no such preemptive effect. The
OSH Act reserves preemption to the sole province of standards, not regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)
(1982).
34 Congress specifically refused to exercise authority over workmen's compensation and both
common-law and statutory employment rights and duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1982). See also
S REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5177, 5199 (Secretary of Labor retains no authority over "particular working conditions regarding
which another Federal agency exercises statutory authority"); Note, Getting Away with Murder:
Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 535, 548 (1987) (OSH Act does not occupy occupational health and safety field).
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only on individual issues of worker health or safety.35
Once a standard takes effect, the only permissible state regulation is
through a state plan approved by the Secretary of Labor.36 Indeed, even
a valid state plan must be at least as effective as the federal standard.3 7 If
a state plan regulates employers in interstate commerce, the OSH Act
requires a compelling local interest and no undue burden on interstate
commerce. 38  When a state regulation is not approved as a state plan,
even meeting these requirements will not bar preemption. 39  The OSH
35. An "occupation safety and health issue" is "an industrial or hazard grouping contained in
any of the subparts to the general industry standards." M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH LAW § 32 (2d ed. 1983).
In revising the OSHA Standard in 1987, the agency went to great lengths to define explicitly
hazard evaluation and communication to workers as an occupational safety and health issue. See
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
36. The state plan provision requires that:
[a]ny State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and en-
forcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occupational
safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated
under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the development of such stan-
dards and their enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1982). The Act sets forth the conditions under which the Secretary "shall ap-
prove" state plans. Id. § 667(c).
The Secretary may approve state plans only if, in his judgment, they "are or will be at least as
effective in providing safe and healthful employment as [the Federal standard]." Id. § 667(c)(2).
Twenty-five state worker right-to-know laws have received OSHA approval under section 667:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wyoming. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1952 (1987). For a more specific discussion of state plans, see Brown, State Plans Under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 745 (1973-74).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1982). In fact, right-to-know legislation in several states cortains
stricter requirements than the OSHA Standard: Alaska, California, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Washington. Tennesee's right-to-know law may be less stringent than the federal
standard. See supra note 8.
38. Approved state plans, "when applicable to products which are distributed or used in inter-
state commerce," must be "required by compelling local conditions and [must] not unduly burden
interstate commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (1982).
39. Congress explicitly rejected proposals to limit the OSH Act's preemptive effect to state laws
"not in conflict with" and "at least as effective as" federal law. See SEN. COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., cited i 52 Fed, Reg. 31,860 (1987). See also 116 CONG.
REC. 38,385 (1970) (statements of Rep. Dent) (OSH Act does not preempt stricter state laws): Note,
OSHA Preemption, supra note 20, at 642-44 (state plan provision, legislative history, and uniformity
policy support preemption of stricter state laws). Although Congress, in passing the Act, showed a
desire to establish uniformity in regulation, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(d), 667(c)(2); S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5177, 5193-
94; 116 CONG. REc. 38,394-404, and to decrease the onus of varied state laws, the primary motiva-
tion behind the OSH Act is employee safety. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Congress
viewed existing state laws as ineffective in achieving worker health and safety. See id.
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Act's preemption clause thus contemplates preemption of any unap-
proved state or local law relating to an issue covered by a standard, re-
gardless of its stringency.
In 1984, OSHA promulgated the federal Hazard Communication
Standard4" to ensure both chemical hazard evaluation and communica-
tion of that information to workers.4 1 The relatively great number of
hazardous substance incidents occurring in the manufacturing sector in-
duced OSHA initially to limit the OSHA Standard's coverage to manu-
facturing employers.42
The standard sets forth requirements for the identification and disclo-
sure of hazardous materials to employees.43 To identify hazardous
40 OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988).
41 OSHA's stated purpose was "'to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or im-
ported are evaluated, and that information concerning their hazards is transmitted to employers and
enmployees." Id., § 1910.1200(a)(1).
There is some evidence that OSHA considered national uniformity a goal in promulgating the
standard. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(d), 664, 667(c)(2); 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,857 (1987) (extension to
nonmanufacturing sector decreases state law compliance costs); id. (uniform standard preempts dif-
ferent local laws); 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,282-83 (1983) (various state laws burdensome); id. at
53,328 (national standard saves one billion dollars over 40 years); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (b)(2)
(1988). But see Tyson, supra note 20, at 1011; Note, OSHA Preemption, supra note 20, at 645 (un-
clear whether uniformity was OSHA goal).
Regardless of OSHA's goals, the boundaries set by Congress limit the agency's administrative
authority. Although Congress did perceive uniformity as a possible benefit of the OSH Act, its
stated purpose contains no reference to this goal. See supra notes 30, 40 and accompanying text. See
alw Note, The Right-to-Know, supra note 8, at 483 (uniformity goal inconsistent with the OSH Act's
purpose).
42 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1988). The OSHA Standard originally defined "employer" as "a
person engaged in a business within [Standard Industrial Classification] codes 20 through 39 where
chemicals are either used, or are produced for use or distribution." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1984).
SIC codes 20-39 define the manufacturing division of the economy. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUI)G1_ I, EXECUTIVL OFFICL OF THE PRESIDENT, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MAN-
tAi 5-7, 59 (1972). The manufacturing sector represents approximately 30% of employment in the
United States. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,853 (1987).
OSHA based its decision to limit the standard's coverage upon illness and injury data compiled by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) OSHA intended that the standard's narrow scope be tempo-
iary, the agency "merely exercised its discretion to establish rulemaking priorities, and chose[ ] to
first regulate those industries with the greatest demonstrated need." 48 Fed. Reg. 53,286 (1983).
According to the BLS data, approximately 48.4% and 47.1% of chemical related injuries and ill-
ncisss occurred in the manufacturing industry in 1976 and 1977, respectively. (The services industry
ranked second with only 13.4% and 14.6% of all injuries and illnesses). 48 Fed. Reg. 53.280, 53.285
(Table 1) (1993).
43 For a concise table outItning the standard's requirements, see Oleinick, Fodor & Susselman.
Risk Managemnent.or Hazardouv Chemical: OSHA s Hazard Communication Standard and EPAs
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chemicals,"4 OSHA relies on independently published lists and evalua-
tions by chemical manufacturers and importers." The OSHA Standard
requires that manufacturers and importers place warning labels on haz-
ardous substance containers.46 Manufacturers and importers also must
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Regulations, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 204-05
(1988) [hereinafter Risk Management 1i].
Evidence of the OSHA Standard's effectiveness is currently not well documented. Two studies
based on Ford Motor Company's hazard communication program indicate some degree of success in
informing workers. See Robins, Klitzman & Aleser, Evaluation of the Ford Motor Company/United
Automobile Workers Hazard Communication Training Program, Progress Report, Department of En-
vironmental and Industrial Health, School of Public Health, University of Michigan (1986); Robins,
Byosier, Hugentobler, Kaminski & Klitzman, Evaluation of the Ford Motor CompanylUnited Auto-
mobile Workers Hazard Communication Program, Interim Report, Department of Environmental
and Industrial Health, School of Public Health, University of Michigan (1988). Between 66% and
75% of Ford's employees observed labeled containers, warning signs, and MSDSs, up to 85% of
which did not exist prior to the program. Id. at Figure 16. For a discussion of the results of these
studies, see Risk Management I1, supra, at 226-27 (suggesting that the "profound impact" supported
by the studies is the OSHA Standard's maximum level of effectiveness).
44. OSHA defines a "hazardous chemical" as either "a physical hazard or a health hazard." 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1988). "Physical hazard," in turn, is defined as "[any] chemical for which
there is scientifically valid evidence that it is a combustible liquid, a compressed gas, explosive,
flammable, an organic peroxide, an oxidizer, pyrophoric, unstable (reactive) or water-reactive," Id,
A health hazard is "a chemical for which there is statistically significant evidence based on at least
one study conducted in accordance with established scientific principles that acute or chronic health
effects may occur in exposed employees." Id. See supra note 2. Appendix A of the OSHA Standard
defines a health hazard in greater detail. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. A (1988). Appendix B con-
tains the criteria necessary for making a hazardous chemical determination. Id. § 19 10.1200 app. B.
45. "Chemical manufacturers and importers shall evaluate chemicals produced in their work-
places or imported by them to determine if they are hazardous." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(1)
(1988). Manufacturers and importers are subject to the mandatory definitions and criteria set forth
in Appendices A and B of the OSHA Standard. Id. § 1910.1200 apps. A & B. Employers may rely
on manufacturer and importer evaluations or conduct their own hazard evaluations. Id.
§ 1910.1200(d)(1). For a helpful diagram of the hazard determination process, see Risk Manage-
mnent II, supra note 43, at 190-91 (Figure I).
In addition to manufacturer and importer evaluations, hazardous chemicals are defined in
OSHA's List of Toxic or Hazardous Substances, Subpart Z of 29 C.F.R. § 1910. The standard relies
on the International Agency for Research on Cancer and National Toxicology Program's Annual
Report on Carcinogens and the U.S. Department of Transportation's chemical list contained in 49
C.F.R. Part 173, app. A. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. A (1988).
46. The OSHA Standard imposes upon chemical manufacturers, importers and distributors the
initial duty of labeling hazardous chemical containers with warnings. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(1)
(1988). The standard also requires the employer to guarantee that all workplace hazardous chemical
containers are properly labeled. Id. § 1910.1200(f)(5). OSHA provides two exceptions to the em-
ployer's labeling duty: (1) when the employer uses other written material "readily accessible" to
employees containing the information required on a label, and (2) when an employee transfers chem-
icals from a labeled container into a portable container for his immediate use. Id. § 1910.1200(f)(6)-
(7).
A label must include chemical identities and appropriate hazard warnings. Id. § 1910.1200
(f)(5)(i)-(ii). OSHA refused to adopt a specific standardized labeling system. The agency reasoned
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provide employers with a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) containing
chemical names and safety instructions for each substance produced or
imported.47 Employers, in turn, must make the hazardous substance in-
formation available to employees48 and provide employees with hazard-
ous chemical training.4 9
The OSHA Standard contains a general preemption clause that defines
the rule's effect on state law. As originally promulgated, the provision
expressed OSHA's intent to "address comprehensively the issue of evalu-
ating and communicating chemical hazards to employees in the manu-
facturing sector, and to preempt any state law pertaining to this
subject."5 The current preemption clause explicitly states that "no state
or political subdivision of a state may adopt.., any requirement relating
to the issue addressed by this Federal standard, except pursuant to a Fed-
erally-approved state plan."5
This preemption clause parallels the preemption section in the OSH
that no particular system is most effective and, in any event, employers must explain their labeling
procedures to employees during the hazard training program. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,301 (1983). See 29
C.F.R. § 1900.1200(h) (1988). Labeling provisions serve as an "immediate warning and as a re-
minder of the more detailed information provided in other forums .... 48 Fed. Reg. 53,301 (1983).
A label is targeted only at "reasonably foreseeable" or "frequent" hazard risks. Id. (statements of
Conservation Foundation, Exhibit 18-2). For a criticism of OSHA's "minimum" labeling system,
see Risk Management I, supra note 43, at 206-I1.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1988). The MSDS is the backbone of the federal hazard commu-
nication scheme. Specifically, an MSDS provides the identity, physical and chemical characteristics,
physical and health hazards, primary entry routes, any relevant exposure limits, safety measures,
and control measures for each hazardous chemical. The MSDS also expresses whether the chemical
has been declared a carcinogen. Id. § 1910.1200(g)(2). The OSHA Standard permits the omission of
a specific chemical identity from an MSDS if the information is a trade secret. Id. § 1910.1200(i)(1).
Other information regarding a chemical's characteristics and hazardous effects may not be withheld.
Many industries voluntarily maintained material safety data sheets containing variable information
before OSHA promulgated the standard. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,306 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 12,104 (1982).
48. The employer must maintain copies of required MSDSs in its establishment and make them
"readily accessible" to employees during work shifts. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(8) (1988). In addi-
tion, the employer may keep the MSDS in a central location for workers who travel between work-
place,. Id. § 19 10.1200(g)( 9 ). Employees must be informed of the location of MSDSs. Id.
§ 19!0l200(h)(I)(iii).
4') To satisfy the OSHA Standard's training requirements, the employer must explain to em-
ployee, the available methods for detecting hazardous chemicals, the physical and health hazards of
the chemicals. various protective measures, the labeling system and the location of MSDSs. 29
C F R § l190.1200(h)(2) (1988)
50 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1984).
51 29 C.F.R § 19101200(a)(2) (1988). OSHA revised the provision in 1987 to define the
parameters of its intended preemption. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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Act itself.52 First, OSHA promulgated its hazard communication rule as
a "standard" and not a "regulation." This procedure gives the rule the
full preemptive effect contemplated by Congress.5 3  Congress granted
OSHA authority to establish both regulations and standards;54 by prop-
erly promulgating a standard, the agency legitimately can preempt state
law. 5 Second, OSHA defined as occupational safety and health issues
the evaluation of hazardous substances and the communication of such
information to employees.56 Finally, the agency expressly determined
that the OSHA Standard preempts state law "relating to"57 hazard eval-
uation and communication. The scope of preemption under the standard
is thus as broad as permitted under the OSH Act. 8
C. Judicial Interpretation
1. Express Preemption: The Primary Purpose Test or Deference to
OSHA
Two federal circuit courts have addressed the preemptive effect of the
original OSHA Standard on state and local laws concerning worker and
52. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988) (the OSHA Standard preemption clause) with
29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1982) (the OSH Act).
53. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. Courts uniformly have approved of OSHA's promulgation of the hazard communication
rule as a standard. See, e.g., New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.
1989); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
One commentator argues that the Hazard Communication Standard is not a "standard" because it
fails to correct an identified risk. He points out that many occupational risks regulated under the
standard have yet to be defined. Having a distinctly informational function, the standard is more
properly labeled a "regulation." Note, Employee Right to Know, supra note 8, at 665.
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. The difference between "relating to" and
"pertaining to" is merely semantic. The purpose of the 1987 amendment was not to alter the mean-
ing of the phrase "pertaining to," but to extend preemption to local laws. See New Jersey Chamber
of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621, 625 (3d Cir. 1989) ("the language 'relating to' does not
sweep much more broadly, if at all, than 'pertaining to.' ").
58. See supra note 32. Because the OSH Act contemplates preemption of state and local laws
imposing stricter obligations on employers, the OSHA Standard similarly preempts stricter state and
local laws. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Prior to the standard's revision, some com-
mentators questioned whether OSHA intended to preempt stricter state standards, See. e.g., Note,
OSHA Preemption, supra note 20, at 642-44 (preempts stricter state laws): Note, Employee Right to
Know, supra note 8, at 663 (stricter state regulations not preempted). In 1987, however, the agency
made clear its intent to preempt all state laws. See infra note 115.
The standard also reflects the OSH Act's exception to general preemption for those "federally-
approved state plan[s]." See supra notes 36, 51 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/4
1989] PREEMPTION OF RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS 1167
community hazard communication.59 Although employing slightly dif-
ferent tests, both circuits focused primarily on the states' asserted pur-
pose. Consequently, the courts found no preemption of state provisions
having any nexus to community health.
The Third Circuit, in New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey [Hughey I], 6 adopted a "primary purpose" test to evaluate a
New Jersey worker and community right-to-know law.6" Under the New
Jersey scheme, state agencies compiled lists identifying workplace and
environmental hazardous substances.62 The state defined an environ-
mental hazard as any substance that "may pose a threat to the public
health and safety."63 The workplace hazardous substance list included
chemicals regulated under the OSHA Standard,64 environmental hazard-
ous substances, and substances that "pose[] a threat to the health or
safety of an employee."65 The statute required employers to complete
surveys on hazardous substances in their establishments and send copies
to state agencies and local public protection departments.66 The public
59 See infra notes 60-107. While these courts interpreted the standard's original preemption
language, the 1987 amendment did not materially alter that language. See supra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of material changes under the amendment, see infra notes 115-
22 and accompanying text.
Florida's Department of Labor is currently reviewing the issue of federal preemption over its
Employee Right-to-Know Act, which contains several provisions not found in the federal standard.
For example, the Florida statute requires employers to post a notice of employee rights, submit
information to local fire departments, and provide annual hazard training to employees. In addition,
employees in Florida may refuse to work or may sue their employers for right-to-know violations.
Finally, Florida's hazardous substance list covers different substances than the OSHA Standard.
While the Department considers the validity of these provisions, it has advised employers to main-
tain compliance with the state law and will consider compliance with the federal standard to be
substantial compliance with state requirements. Telephone interview with Reinaldo Manzo, Florida
Department of Labor and Employment Security, Tallahassee, Florida (Sept. 13, 1989). If the De-
partmcnt concludes that provisions of the Florida law are invalid, the state legislature will decide
whether to amend the statute or continue its enforcement. Id.
60 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985)
61 The New Jersey statute regulated hazard communication to both workers and the commu-
nty. N.J. S.vr. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to -31 (West 1986).
62 774 F.2d at 591. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was responsible
for compiling an en' ironmental hazardous substance list. New Jersey's Department of Health devel-
oped the workplace hazardous substance list See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-4(a), -5(a) (West
19M6)
03 774 F.2d at 591. The environmental hazardous substance list also contained substances
konnccted to specific diseases and malfunctions. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-4(a) (West 1986).
64 Scc upra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
65, 774 F.2d at 591.
66 Id. Employers submitted workplace and environmental surveys to the New Jersey Depart-
ments of Health and Environmental Protection, respectively. Local fire and police departments re-
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could obtain information on both types of substances upon request to the
appropriate state agency.67 The New Jersey statute also mandated that
employers make hazardous substance information accessible to employ-
ees,68 establish employee hazard communication training programs, 69
and label hazardous substance containers in the workplace.7 °
The court in Hughey I found that the federal standard expressly pre-
empted only those sections of the New Jersey statute that had as their
"primary purpose" the promotion of occupational health or safety in the
manufacturing sector.71 In determining the primary purpose of a provi-
sion, the court deferred entirely to the state's characterization.72 Thus,
ceived both workplace and environmental surveys from employers. See N.J. STAT. ANN, § 34:5A-7
(West 1986). After receiving a. workplace survey, the Department of Health provided the employer
with a hazardous substance fact sheet. Id. § 34:5A-5(d).
67. 774 F.2d at 591. "Any person" had access to environmental surveys upon written request
to the appropriate department. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-9, -10 (West 1986).
68. 774 F.2d at 591. The statute required employers to file workplace hazardous substance fact
sheets, which they received from the Department of Health, in a central location at the facility and
to notify employees of the location. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-12 (West 1986).
69. 774 F.2d at 591. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-13 (West 1986).
70. 774 F.2d at 591. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-146 (West 1986). Subsection 14(a) required
the labeling of certain environmental and workplace hazardous chemicals, while subsection 14(b)
governed the labeling of every container in a facility.
71. 774 F.2d at 595. The court reasoned that the federal standard preempts New Jersey's right-
to-know law "only insofar as the New Jersey Act pertains to protection of employee health and
safety in the manufacturing sector." Id. at 593. The Supreme Court has used the "primary pur-
pose" language in applying the express preemption doctrine. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) ("primary purpose" of
state law is utility regulation and therefore not preempted by federal law regulating nuclear safety).
Two courts that addressed the preemption of state asbestos laws under OSHA's Asbestos Stan-
dard have questioned the Third Circuit's primary purpose test. In New Jersey State Chamber of
Commerce v. New Jersey, 653 F. Supp. 1453 (D.N.J. 1987), the court interpreted Hughey I and
Knepper as having two possible effects on a state law with dual purposes. First, the court reasoned
that a state law may have two primary purposes. Because one of the primary purposes is occupa-
tional health and safety, this reading renders all dual purpose provisions preempted. Id. at 1465.
Alternatively, the court posited that neither purpose of the law clearly can be the law's primary
purpose. Thus, federal law would preempt no provisions of dual purpose state laws. Id.
The Second Circuit implicitly rejected the primary purpose test to determine the degree of pre-
emption of a city asbestos program. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988). The court stated that "'primary' is an ambiguous word and to adopt its use
leads down an unmarked avenue of inquiry into legislative motive." Id. at 57. Rather than apply
the primary purpose rationale, the Second Circuit required a "legitimate and substantial purpose
apart from the promotion of occupational safety and health." Id.
72. 774 F.2d at 590. See N.J. STAr. ANN. § 34:5A-2 (West 1986). The Third Circuit's defer-
ence to New Jersey's asserted purpose is consistent with the Supreme Court's preemption analysis.
Particularly in the realm of express preemption, the Court usually accepts a state's asserted purpose
as the actual motivation behind state law. See supra note 20.
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the court invalidated the state's requirements for workplace hazardous
substance reporting, employee disclosure, and container labeling.73 In
the process, the court rejected the argument that public availability of the
information necessitated a finding of a nonoccupational purpose.74
Nevertheless, because New Jersey relied on state agencies, rather than
chemical manufacturers, to identify hazardous substances, the Hughey I
court concluded that federal law did not expressly preempt workplace
hazardous substance lists. 75 The court also found that the OSHA Stan-
dard did not preempt any provisions that referred to environmental haz-
ardous substances. 76
One year after Hughey I, the Third Circuit more clearly articulated its
primary purpose test in Manufacturers Association of Tri-County v. Knep-
per.7 7 The Pennsylvania statute78 contained hazard communication re-
73, Id. at 595. The Third Circuit found the labeling provisions invalid only as applied to work-
place hazards in the manufacturing sector. The Hughey I court, however, remanded to the district
court for a determination of whether the labeling requirements not expressly preempted were never-
theless impliedly preempted. Id. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the implied preemption issue in Hughey I.
Severability is a threshold issue in determining the extent to which state law is preempted. If a
state statute is not severable, a finding that one provision is preempted necessitates invalidating the
entire statute. Severability is a question of state law. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1941).
Because New Jersey specifically had provided for severability, the Third Circuit invalidated only the
preempted provisions of the state's Right-to-Know Act. 774 F.2d at 596-98. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
I :1-:10 (West 1984) (severability of statutes).
74, 774 F.2d at 595. The court noted that the submission of workplace hazardous substance
survey's to public protection agencies represents a "broader purpose" than purely employee protec-
tion Id. Nevertheless, the court found the New Jersey statute's "primary purpose" to be "the
promotion of occupational safety and health through hazard communication." Id.
75. Id. at 594-95. Despite OSHA's reliance on chemical manufacturers to identify hazardous
substances, the court reasoned that "New Jersey's undertaking to develop its own list of hazardous
substances .. . will in no way inhibit the implementation of the federal standard." Id. See Risk
Managenent 1, supra note 2, for a comparison of government agency lists and chemical manufac-
turer lists.
7o. 774 F.2d at 594-96.
77 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 66 (1987). The Supreme Court denied
Pennsylvania's request for certiorari. In an amicus curiae brief, the Solicitor General opposed grant-
ing certiorari. Solicitor General's Amicus Curiae Brief, Knepper v. Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-
County, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 66 (1987). The Solicitor General
argued that "ft]he Third Circuit's decision is troublesome" and that the primary purpose test is
"'indeterminate." Id. at 9. 15. According to the Solicitor General, the federal standard preempts
pro'isions whose primary purpose or effect is the regulation of hazard communication or evaluation.
Id. at 13 The Solicitor General based his request to deny certiorari on the hope that, in light of the
OSHA Standard's extension and the enactment of EPCRA, states would remove themselves from
the spherc of OSHA regulation. Id. at 14-15.
7x I',\. Si ,-. ANN. tit. 35. § 7301 (Purdon 1986). Following the Knepper decision. Penn-
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quirements substantively similar to the New Jersey right-to-know law at
issue in Hughey I. 9 The Pennsylvania law, however, established a com-
prehensive scheme that did not regulate "workplace" and "environmen-
tal" hazardous substances separately. The statute's general "hazardous
substances" category included substances on OSHA's list, as well as sub-
stances deemed hazardous to the environment.80
'Relying on its decision in Hughey I, the Third Circuit in Knepper fo-
cused on the primary purpose of the Pennsylvania law to determine the
degree of federal preemption.81 Under this test, the court required the
state to show a purpose other than hazard communication to employees
in the manufacturing industry. 2 According to the court, a state statute's
primary purpose may include occupational health and safety as long as it
also serves a "broader" goal.8 3
Applying its primary purpose test, the Knepper court held that the
OSHA Standard did not preempt provisions requiring the general disclo-
sure of hazardous substance information. 4 The court left intact all iden-
tification and survey report requirements concerning both workplace and
environmental hazards.8 Additionally, because the MSDS and labeling
provisions "facilitate[d] compliance with" nonpreempted provisions, the
sylvania's Department of Labor and Industry proposed revising its right-to-know legislation. See 42
Pa. Bull. 4027 (Oct. 18, 1986).
79. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. Like the New Jersey right-to-know law,
Pennsylvania's statute required that the state's Department of Labor and Industry compile hazard-
ous substance lists and that employers submit hazardous substance surveys to emergency health and
safety agencies, label all hazardous substance containers, and post the surveys for employees. 801
F.2d at 136-38.
80. 801 F.2d at 136. Pennsylvania's "hazardous substance" list included chemicals on OSHA's
list, environmental hazardous substances, and substances with "known or probable adverse human
or environmental effects." Id. The district court defined a "workplace hazardous substance" as a
substance included on the general hazardous substance list but not categorized as an environmental
hazardous substance. Id. at 134 n.6. The state law, however, did not use the term "workplace
hazardous substance."
81. 801 F.2d at 138-39. The Third Circuit concluded that the hazardous substance survey
provision "does not have as its primary purpose the promotion of occupational health and safety
through hazard communication." Id. at 138.
82. Id. at 138. The court found that both the survey provision and the MSDS provision serve
purposes other than hazardous substance communication to workers. Id. at 138. 141.
83. Id. at 136, 138. The court recognized that all of the substances contained on the general
hazardous substance list, including nonenvironmental substances, "may pose hazards not only to
workers, but also to the environment if they escape." 801 F.2d at 138. This public health nexus.
representing broader concerns than workplace safety, saved the survey and labeling provisions from
federal preemption. Id. at 138, 139.
84. Id. at 138.
85. Id. at 137 (hazardous substance list), 138 (survey).
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court reasoned that they too served a broader purpose than employee
health and safety.8 6 The Third Circuit thus invalidated only the em-
ployee training and education provisions.87 The court distinguished the
Pennsylvania statute from the New Jersey statute at issue in Hughey I
solely on the comprehensive nature of the Pennsylvania scheme.88
Shortly after the Third Circuit's Knepper decision, the Sixth Circuit
employed a different preemption analysis of a local right-to-know law in
Ohio Manufacturers Association v. City of Akron.89 Similar to the state
laws in Hughey I9" and Knepper,9' the Akron city ordinance regulated
container labeling, hazardous substance reporting, MSDS preparation,
employee training, and communication to local public protection
agencies. 
2
In determining the scope of federal preemption, the Akron court de-
ferred to the OSHA Standard's explicit language.93 The court recog-
nized that the ordinance had two purposes-regulating both
86 Id. at 139-41.
The presence of the required labels on all hazardous-substances containers will facilitate
employer compliance with general hazardous substance survey obligations and employer
compliance with the more specific environmental hazard survey obligations .... Thus it
cannot be said that the primary purpose of the supplier's labeling requirement, even with
respect to manufacturing-sector customers, is hazard communication to employees.
Id. at 139 (citations omitted). The court similarly found that the MSDS requirements facilitate
preparation of hazardous substance survey provisions. Id. at 141.
87 Id. at 142.
XS The court characterized the differences in the hazard identification processes as "signifi-
cant " Id. at 138
89 801 F,2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986). appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 44 (1987).
90. See upra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
91. Sc supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
2. 801 F.2d at 826. Akron's ordinance, like the New Jersey and Pennsylvania right-to-know
lax% , combined regulation of worker and community hazard communication. Akron's Health Com-
mission was responsible for compiling a hazardous substance list, including chemicals found on
OSHA's list, the U. S. Department of Transportation list, and specific cancerous and toxic chemical
lists Id. at 825-26. The labeling provision included not only the chemical name, but also applicable
Department of Transportation labels, cancer warnings, and reproductive warnings. Id.
93 Id. at 831-32. Although the OSHA Standard referred specifically to preemption of state
law only, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it preempts local law as well. As promulgated in 1984,
the standard's preemption clause explicitly preempted only state laws. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2)
(1984) When OSHA revised the standard, the agency incorporated local law within its express
preemptive scope. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988). Based on the legislative history and pur-
poses of the OSHA Standard, the court found the omission of the term "local" from the standard's
preemption clause to be of little significance. 801 F.2d at 828-31. A literal reading of the preemp-
tion provisin would conflict with OSHA's intent to create a national occupational safety and health
standard. See id. at 831.
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occupational and community health and safety 94 -and found it unneces-
sary to adopt a "primary purpose" test. Consequently, the court invali-
dated the ordinance "to the extent that it attempt[ed] to regulate
employee safety" in the manufacturing sector.95 The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination
of which specific provisions the OSHA Standard preempted.96
2. Implied Preemption
The Third Circuit in Hughey I also set forth a standard for determin-
ing implied preemption of nonfederal community and worker right-to-
know laws.97 According to the court, implied preemption exists if com-
'pliance with both state and federal laws proves impossible or if state law
thwarts the federal purpose.98 A finding that a state provision merely
increases the regulatory burden on employers is insufficient to establish
implied preemption.99 The court found neither the environmental nor
workplace hazardous substance lists of the New Jersey law impliedly pre-
empted as applied to nonmanufacturing employers. 00
Because of the limited factual nature of the appeals in Hughey I, the
94. Id. at 834. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the Akron ordinance not only regulated occu-
pational health and safety, but that "[it] also had as its purpose protection of the public and the
providing of information to city fire fighters and public health officials." Id. The court effectively
refused to label either of these purposes as the primary purpose of the ordinance.
The Sixth Circuit recognized that it should accord "[c]onsiderable weight" to an administrative
agency's statutory interpretation. Id. at 833. The court declared OSHA's exercise of administrative
power in preempting local laws entirely within the congressional delegation of authority under the
OSH Act. Id. at 834.
95. Id.
96. Id. The trial court's failure to determine the severability of the Akron ordinance necessi-
tated further findings concerning each provision of the ordinance.
97. Hughey I, 774 F.2d 587, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1985). While inquiring into the implied preemp-
tive effect of a statute containing an express preemption provision might appear problematic, the
Third Circuit in Hughey I performed just such an analysis.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 593. According to the Hughey I court, "the mere fact that a state law provision
increases the regulatory burden on employers does not make the state law provision contrary to
congressional intent." Id. The Third Circuit also refrained from denying the theory that confusion
of workers by environmental hazardous substance labels might constitute an obstacle to the federal
purpose. Id. at 596. See also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
100. 774 F.2d at 595. The court determined that New Jersey's hazardous substance lists and
OSHA's hazardous substance list "comfortably coexist." Id. The Third Circuit remanded to the
district court for a finding of whether the environmental hazardous substance labeling provision is
implicitly 1rdempted. Id. at 596, 598. The Third Circuit reaffirmed this position in Knepper, finding
no implied preemption of Pensylvania's hazardous substance survey provision. Knepper, 801 F.2d
at 135.
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court remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the
universal labeling provision was impliedly preempted.' 0 On appeal after
remand, the Third Circuit in New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey [Hughey I] 102 considered the implied preemption of this label-
ing provision."03 The plaintiffs argued that the existence of two labeling
systems would confuse and overwhelm workers to the extent that it
would undermine the federal labeling scheme."° Under a clearly errone-
ous standard of review, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's find-
ing that the state's universal labeling requirements did not thwart the
purposes of the federal standard. 05 The court in HUughey 1I explained
that OSHA's labeling requirements "may reasonably be construed to re-
quire that the hazard information be presented in such a way as to pre-
vent unnecessary worker confusion . . 106 The court indicated that
worker training and label formatting and positioning can assist workers
in distinguishing the OSHA label from other labels."°7
101 774 F.2d at 596.
102 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1989).
103 The universal labeling requirements contained in N.J. STAT. § 34:5A-14(b) (west 1988)
mandate the labeling of all containers that are not statutorily excepted. 868 F.2d at 624. On re-
mand, the Third Circuit addressed the threshold issue of the extent to which Hughey I held the
universal labeling provision expressly preempted. Because the court in Hughey I characterized sec-
tion 14(b) a,; a community right-to-know provision, only the implied preemption question remained
open for the Third Circuit in Hughey H. Id. at 626-28.
104. Id. at 628. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that confusion would arise from
(i) the very existence of two labeling systems and the inability of workers to determine
which one pertains to worker hazards, (ii) the multiplicity of labels, tending to overwhelm
the OSHA hazard labels; (iii) the labeling of hazardous components of mixtures on con-
tamers which do not require an OSHA hazard label; (iv) the labeling of a non-hazardous
component of a mixture which is in fact hazardous and must carry an OSHA hazard label;
and (v) the existence of different numbering systems which will make it difficult for a
worker to find the appropriate [OSHA material safety data sheets].
Id at 628.29 (quoting Dist. Ct. Op. at 29).
105 Id at 629. The court. however, exercised plenary review over the district court's legal
conclusion that the federal standard implicitly preempts the labeling provision. Id.
106. Id. at 630.
107 Id. at 629. The Third Circuit adopted the district court's reasoning concerning worker
training and labeling methods. The district court enumerated the following justifications for uphold-
ing the provision: 1) OSHA did not intend that its label be the only label on containers because
containers typically contain many labels, 2) worker training can help employees identify the OSHA
label, 3) the labels required under New Jersey law "'would not change the situation materially," 4)
proper formatting and positioning can allow employees to distinguish the OSHA label from others,
5) informing workers of hazardous substances is in the manufacturers' best interests, 6) OSHA con-
templated proper formatting and positioning, and 7) "there is no reason to believe that proper and
effective formatting and positioning will not be the rule." Id. (quoting the Dist. Ct. Op. at 29). The
Third Circuit thu, concluded that no worker confusion would occur "if employers took such easy-
to-implement step,, as boxing off the New Jersey information or providing headings to inform the
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II. RECENT FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The only challenges to state and local right-to-know laws arose before
the expansion of the federal OSHA Standard or the enactment of
EPCRA.'° Both the amended standard and EPCRA, however, play im-
portant roles in determining the validity of state and local right-to-know
statutes. The amended OSHA Standard clarifies OSHA's position on the
standard's preemptive effect. EPCRA similarly indicates the extent to
which Congress intended to preempt state and local laws.
A. Expansion of the Hazard Comunication Standard
The 1984 promulgation of the OSHA Standard created a dual system
of state and federal hazard communication regulation. The Third and
Sixth Circuit decisions, Hughey I, Hughey II, Knepper, and Akron, rein-
forced the notion that states were free to regulate hazardous substance
communication to workers in the nonmanufacturing industry.'0 9 The
existing scheme subjected nonmanufacturing companies engaged in inter-
state commerce to multiple state regulation.1 '0 Selective preemption also
proved burdensome for nonmanufacturing employers doing business
with federally regulated manufacturers.' As a separate concern, nearly
half of all hazardous substance incidents were occurring in the nonmanu-
facturing sector. 12
reader whether the information under the headings was required by the federal standard or New
Jersey law." Id. at 630.
108. The final decisions in Knepper, decided on September 12, 1986, and Akron, decided on
September 17, 1986, postdated the August 1986 enactment of EPCRA by only one month. Two
actions have been brought since 1987. The construction industry sought a review of the OSHA
Standard's expansion to the nonmanufacturing sector in American Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.
Brock, 862 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1988) (denying petition for review). See infra note 113. Additionally,
two chemical industry groups have challenged California's Proposition 65, which requires employee
warning hazards not contained in the federal standard. The case is currently pending in district
court. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. California Health & Welfare Agency, No. Civ.-s-88-1615-Lkk (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 16, 1988).
109. See supra notes 59-107 and accompanying text. Twelve states regulated hazard communi-
cation to nonmanufacturing employees prior to 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,855 (1987).
110. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852. 31,857 (1987). Nonmanufacturing employers engaged in interstate
commerce were subject to regulation in more than one state. For example, some states required the
labeling of substance containers shipped from out of state. This prescription mandated knowledge of
and compliance with many different requirements. Manufacturers also had to comply with different
state requirements regulating environmental hazards. See supra note 8 (state statutes).
111. Even within a single state, manufacturers regulated by the federal standard had to be aware
of different state obligations imposed on nonmanufacturers with whom they did business. 52 Fed.
Reg. 31,852, 31,861 (1987).
112. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,285 (Table I) (1983).
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In litigation that raised these observations, the Third Circuit in 1985
ordered OSHA to expand the standard's reach 13 In 1987, OSHA ex-
tended its regulation to nonmanufacturing employers,' 14 and amended
the OSHA Standard to indicate clearly an intent to preempt state and
local laws." 5 The agency included in the standard's preemption clause a
definition of the occupational safety and health issue it regulates. The
revised standard provides that hazard evaluation and communication
-may include ... but is not limited to" the compilation of workplace
hazardous substance lists, distribution of MSDSs to employees, employee
training programs, and container labeling requirements.116
In explaining the change in the OSHA Standard's preemption clause,
OSHA cited Hughey I and Knepper. 17 Although OSHA did not ex-
113 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 855 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988) (USWA 111);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987) (USWA 11); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) (USWA I). The court in USWA I ordered
espansion of the OSHA Standard to the nonmanufacturing sector unless OSHA could show it would
be technically and economically infeasible to expand. 763 F.2d at 739. By 1987, OSHA had not
fully complied with the expansion order and the court in USWA II ordered promulgation of a revised
standard within 60 days. 819 F.2d at 1270. The court in USWA III enforced the previous USWA
judgments. 855 F.2d at 113-14.
114 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b) (1988); 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987). Under the extended
standard, chemical manufacturers, importers and distributors were required to supply MSDSs to
nonmanufacturing customers by September 23, 1987. The deadline for nonmanufacturer compli-
ance wvas May 23. 1988. Before the extension of the OSHA Standard, thirteen states had incorpo-
rated nonmanufacturing employers into their worker right-to-know laws. Id. at 31,870.
The e\tent of regulation over the construction industry, however, proved difficult to define. The
Secretary of Labor temporarily postponed enforcement in the construction sector. The construction
industry has proposed a separate hazard communication standard for regulation of its members.
OSHA consequently has recognized that modification of the rule may be necessary in the construc-
tion industry Id. at 31,859 (1987).
115 Id. at 31,860 (1987). OSHA revised the preemption clause "to more explicitly state the
Agency's position regarding preemption based on the provisions of the Act and related legal ac-
lions : Id.
116 The preemption provision currently reads:
This occupational safety and health standard is intended to address comprehensively the
issue of evaluating the potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating information
concerning hazards and appropriate proteetve measures to employees, and to preempt any
legail requirement, of a state, or political subdivision of a state, pertaining to the subject.
Ev aluating the potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating information concerning
hazards and appropriate protective measures to employees, may include, for example, but
is not limited to, provisions for developing and maintaining a written hazard communica-
tion program for the workplace. including lists of hazardous chemicals present; labeling of
containers of chemicals in the workplace, as well as of containers of chemicals being
shipped to other workplaces. preparation and distribution of material safety data sheets to
employees, . and development and implementation of employee training programs ....
21) C F R § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988)
117 52 Fed. Reg. 31.852. 31.860 (1987)
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pressly adopt the Third Circuit's analysis, the agency borrowed its "pri-
mary purpose" language. OSHA expressed an intent that the standard
preempt any state or local provision enacted "for the primary purpose of
assuring worker safety and health."' 8 OSHA's definition of "primary
purpose," however, includes exceptions that distinguish it from the Third
Circuit's. Contrary to the decisions in Hughey I and Knepper,119 OSHA
explicitly placed hazardous substance lists within its preemptive scope. 120
In addition, unlike the Third Circuit's decision in Knepper, 12 ' the agency
intended to preempt local MSDS requirements.122
. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
The 1984 hazardous chemical release incident in Bhopal, India, sent
Congress a message of the importance of toxic chemical disclosure to the
public.123 After surveying the "patchwork" of state and local commu-
nity right-to-know laws, Congress proposed a comprehensive federal pro-
gram. 124  Just one month before the Third Circuit's decision in
Knepper,125 Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act. 126  Subchapter I of EPCRA regulates local emer-
gency response planning. 127 Subchapter II contains reporting require-
118. OSHA stated that "any State or local government provision requiring [hazardous substance
communication or evaluation] ... for the primary purpose of assuring worker safety and health,
would be preempted by the [OSHA Standard]." Id. at 31,861.
119. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988); supra note 116. OSHA, in using permissive lan-
guage, did not necessarily preempt all hazardous substance lists. However, directly following its
discussion of Knepper, the agency recognized hazardous substance lists as subject to preemption. See
52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,860-61 (1987). Because the Third Circuit found no preemption of state
hazardous substance list provisions, the agency's inclusion of such lists in its definition of hazardous
substance evaluation implicitly rejects the Knepper court's holding.
121. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
122. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988). See supra note 116.
123. In December 1984, hazardous gas leaked from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India.
The catastrophe was one of the worst hazardous substance incidents ever. See OSHA, SYSTEMS
SAFETY EVALUATIONS OF OPERATIONS WITH CATASTROPHIC POTENTIAL CPL 2-2 (1987). In
1985, the Indian government brought suit against Union Carbide on behalf of all Indian victims.
Bhopal: Legislative Fallout in the United States, CHEMICAl. WEEK, Feb. 6, 1985, at 26.
124. H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 97, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3124, 3220.
125. See supra notes 77-88.
126. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11.001-11,050
(Supp. V 1987).
127. Subchapter I, entitled "Emergency Planning and Notification," requires the governor of
each state to establish a state emergency response commission (SERC). 42 U.S.C § 11,001(a) (Supp.
V 1987). The SERC receives information requests from the public and designates emergeIcy phl.
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ments for disclosure of hazardous substance information to the public.12
EPCRA's scheme is based on three reporting mechanisms: material
safety data sheets, emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms,
and toxic chemical release forms. Employers who must maintain an
MSDS under the OSHA Standard'29 must provide the information con-
tained therein 3 ' and a completed chemical inventory form to local emer-
gency planning committees, state emergency response commissions and
local fire departments.' Employers must also submit toxic chemical
ning districts. Id. § 11,001(a), (b). The SERC is also required to appoint local emergency response
committees (LERCs) which are responsible for the creation and implementation of comprehensive
emergency response plans. Id. § 11,001(c), (d).
Subchapter I also directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to publish an extremely
hazardous substance list and establish threshold substance amounts for the enforcement of reporting
provisions. Id. § 11,002(a)(2), (a)(3). The EPA has proposed regulations setting forth data sheet
and inventory reporting requirements. See 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,860 (1987). At least two com-
mentators, however, have questioned the EPA's commitment and effectiveness in promulgating reg-
ulations. See Berkowitz, The Law & the Promise, 5 ENVrL. F. 24, 28 (1988); Bromberg, Right-to-
Know: Much Pain, Little Gain, 5 ENVTL. F. 24, 24 (1988).
All fifty states have formed SERCs and over 3500 localities have established LERCs. Makris,
Now It'% Everybody's Job, 5 ENVTL. F. 25, 25 (1988). Twenty-five states have enacted community
right-to-know legislation pursuant to EPCRA. Id. Many state and local governments, however,
may not have reserved enough resources to administer community right-to-know programs effec-
tively. Matsumato. Confrontation or Compromise?, 5 ENvTL. F. 25, 25 (1988); Solyst, When the
Going Got Tough. . ., 5 ENVTL. F. 26. 26 (1988).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,021-11,023 (Supp. V 1987). Subchapter II, entitled "Reporting Require-
ments," creates the employer's duty to submit material safety data sheets, emergency and hazardous
chemical inventory forms, and toxic chemical release forms to local public protection agencies. See
vinra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
129. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1988); supra note 47 and accompanying text.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 11,021(a)(l). Instead of submitting an MSDS, an employer may submit a list of
chemicals for which an MSDS is required under the OSHA Standard, the chemical or common
names of such chemicals, and the hazardous components of such chemicals. 42 U.S.C.
, 11,021(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
When Congress enacted EPCRA, the MSDS provisions applied only to manufacturing employers.
With the OSHA Standard's expansion to the nonmanufacturing sector, however, EPCRA require-
ments apply to all employers. Some argue that application of EPCRA to nonmanufacturers presents
a"paperwork nightmare" not intended by Congress. See Bromberg, supra note 127, at 29.
131 42 U.S.C. § 11,022(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Employers may choose between two reporting
methods for compiling emergency and hazardous inventory forms: Tier I and Tier II reporting. Id.
bI 1.022(a)(2). Tier I reporting allows an employer to group chemicals into five "hazard" catego-
ries Id § 11,022(d)(1). An employer using Tier II, on the other hand, provides information on
indisidual substances. Id. § I 1.022(d)(2). Tier II reporting creates a greater burden for employers,
particularly small businesses not subject to the OSHA Standard. However, the aggregation of sub-
,tacs into hazard groups may serve as a disincentive for some employers who choose the less
burdensome Tier I option. See Bromberg, supra note 127, at 24. The EPA has considered accepting
more easily conipilable foirms as substitutes for Tier I or Tier II information for certain chemicals
Ge g. petroleum stored in underground tanks). Id. at 29.
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release forms to both the Environmental Protection Agency and state
officials. 132 The information provided under EPCRA is available to the
community. 133
EPCRA and the OSHA Standard overlap considerably. 34  With few
exceptions, EPCRA's definition of "hazardous chemical" wholly incor-
porates OSHA's hazardous substance list. 135 Moreover, two reporting
requirements in EPCRA apply only to employers covered by the OSHA
Standard. 136 In fact, Congress considered EPCRA's community right-
to-know program as simply "an extension of the OSHA Hazard Commu-
nication Standard."'137
EPCRA and the OSHA Standard differ significantly, however, in the
degree to which they preempt state law. EPCRA contains a savings
clause, section 321, which broadly provides that "[n]othing in this chap-
ter shll preempt any state or local law."' 38 Nevertheless, Congress did
not entirely preclude preemption. An exception to the general an-
132. 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (Supp. V 1987). A toxic chemical release form must be submitted only
for chemicals specifically designated as toxic in quantities exceeding the established toxic chemical
threshold level. Id. § 11,023(a)(1), (c), (f). Sections 11,021 and 11,022 specifically require that
MSDS and Tier II information, respectively, be available to the public through either local emer-
gency planning committees or state emergency response commissions. Id. §§ 11,021(c)(2),
11,022(e)(3).
133. EPCRA also contains a general requirement that "[e]ach emergency response plan, mate-
rial safety data sheet, list described in section 11021(a)(2) of this title, inventory form, toxic chemical
release form, and followup emergency notice shall be made available to the general public .,. during
normal working hours" at a designated location. 42 U.S.C. § 11,044(a) (Supp. V 1987). In addition,
"[e]ach local emergency planning committee shall annually publish a notice in local newspapers that
the emergency response plan, material safety data sheets, and inventory forms have been s-Ibmitted
under this section." Id. § 11,044(b).
134. For a comparative analysis of EPCRA and the OSHA Standard, see generally Risk Man-
agement 11, supra note 43.
135. EPCRA provides that "the term 'hazardous chemical' has the meaning given such term by
[29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c)] .... 42 U.S.C. § 11,021(e). See supra note 44. EPCRA excepts three
types of chemicals found on OSHA's list: (1) food, food additives, drugs, color additives, and cos-
metics regulated by the Food and Drug Administration: (2) solid substances present in manufac-
tured items which do not pose exposure threats; and (3) substances used by the general public for
personal or household use. Id. § 11,021(e)(l)-(3).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,021, 11,022 (Supp. V 1987). See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text.
137. H.R. Rri'. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 111, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Nj'Ws 2835, 2893. According to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, EPCRA
expands OSHA's principle of employee right to know in that members of the community "have
access to the same information as do workers under the OSHA standard." Id. at 110-11.
138. EPCRA § 321, 42 U.S.C. § 1 1,041(a)(l) (Supp. V 1987). States and localities remain free
to adopt and enforce laws. Id. § I 1,041(a)(2).
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tipreemption clause exists for states requiring preparation of MSDSs. 139
Under the exception, a state-required MSDS must be identical to the
federal MSDS in content and form.' 4° A state, however, may demand
the submission of information "supplemental" to the federal re-
quirements. '
4
'
In designing section 321, the Senate and the House defined the legisla-
tion's preemptive effect somewhat differently. A Senate amendment pro-
posed specific language retaining only those nonfederal laws that require
-submission of information related to hazardous substances, toxic chemi-
cal substances, pollutants or contaminants or other materials, or [that]
require the submission or distribution of information related to hazard-
ous substances."' 42 The House, preferring a more general savings provi-
sion, revised section 321 to preserve all state and local laws "relating to
the submission of information related to hazardous chemicals."'' 43 The
House also proposed an exception for preempting state laws requiring the
submission of MSDS forms and supplemental information. 1" The Joint
Conference Committee interpreted the final version of the provision as
-[r]eflecting the policy" of both the House and Senate amendments.' 45
Section 321's legislative history supports a broad reading of its scope.
One member of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion explained that "[i]t makes inherently good sense to let communities
have the final say in designing community right to know programs."'
' 46
Even those legislators dissatisfied with EPCRA agreed that it should pre-
139. Id. § 321(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11,041(b). This exception applies only to state or local laws en-
acted after August I, 1985.
140 State or local law requiring the submission of a material safety data sheet "shall require that
the data ,.heet be identical in content and form to the data sheet required under subsection (a) of
'ection 11,021 of this title." Id. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
141 In addition, a state or locality may require the submission of information that is supplemen-
tal to the information required on the data sheet (including information on the location and quantity
of hazardous chemicals present at the facility) through additional sheets attached to the data sheet or
Such other means as the state or locality considers appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 11,041(b) (Supp. V
1987)
142. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 183, 302, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWSs 3276, 3395 (joint explanatory statement of conference committee).
143 Id. While this limiting language is not present in the law as passed, see supra text accompa-
nying note 138, it is unlikely that the House's version would have had any greater preemptive effect
becau'.e of it.
144. Id
145 Id
14t H.R. Ri.P No. 253(V). 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 97, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADNiN. NEws 3124, 3220.
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serve all nonfederal right-to-know laws. t4 7 Consistent with the common
concern for local law, these dissenters also recommended a narrow con-
struction of the MSDS exception to the savings clause.148
EPCRA's legislative history also indicates that a presumption of rea-
sonableness underlay Congress' desire to preserve state law. Congress
paid considerable attention to protecting employers from varied regula-
tion. 149 The House Energy and Commerce Committee was concerned
that "the public's ability to learn about hazardous chemicals ... [not]
become impaired because of a plethora of inconsistent, impractical State
and local requirements."'' 10 The close parallel between EPCRA and the
OSHA Standard was specifically designed to prevent "needless duplica-
tion."'' As the Committee explained, "[b]ecause a great deal of the haz-
ardous chemicals covered by this title will be travelling in interstate
commerce... Federal law should control in this area."' 52 Indeed, some
members of Congress interpreted EPCRA's savings clause as creating a
floor below which states and municipalities may not regulate., 5 3  The
potential burden on employers served as the primary motivation behind
the MSDS exception to section 321. The House committee proposed the
exception to "create national uniformity in hazardous chemical reporting
that should minimize costs."' 5 4 Although this provision permits supple-
mental information requirements, Congress expected that such informa-
147. Dissenters from the passage of EPCRA confessed that "[t]he clear intent of this provision is
to protect from preemption all state and local community right-to-know laws .... H. REP. No.
253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 296, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2835, 2971
(separate and dissenting views).
148. "Given the overriding intent to preserve state and local community right-to-know laws, this
exception [to section 321] should be narrowly construed and should apply only to state and local
provisions that specifically call for a 'material safety data shelet.'" Id.
149. An important goal of EPCRA was to reduce the possible costs on employers, See id. at 59-
60. Congress estimated that EPCRA would save money for employers already subject to state and
local community right-to-know regulation.
150. Id. at 115. The Committee thus hoped that "[s]tates and localities will follow the Federal
program closely." Id.
151. Id. at I11.
152. Id. at 115.
153. Several congressmen suggested that "[t]he clear intent of this provision is ... to ensure that
the federal community right-to-know program sets a floor, rather than a ceiling for hazardous chem-
ical information." Id. at 296 (dissenting views). The Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion agreed that "any Federal right to know law should establish a floor rather than a ceiling to State
and local efforts .... " H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 97, reprinted In 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3124, 3220.
154. H. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 59-60, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2841-42.
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tion would be "reasonable and concise." 55
In considering EPCRA, Congress made no reference to the Third and
Sixth Circuit opinions.156 Ordinarily, a presumption that Congress knew
of prior judicial decisions attaches to federal legislation. 157 However, be-
cause enactment of EPCRA so closely followed Hughey I and preceded
Knepper and Akron by one month, the presumption may have less merit.
At the very least, Congress was aware that the OSHA Standard expressly
preempted state worker right-to-know laws in the manufacturing sec-
tor.158 Congress might also have foreseen the standard's impending ex-
pansion to nonmanufacturing employers.159
III. THE EFFECT OF EPCRA AND THE REVISED OSHA STANDARD
ON PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
A. Express Preemption: The Primary Purpose Test
A court's only responsibilty in determining federal preemption is to
identify congressional or administrative intent. Courts have no authority
to extend preemption beyond a clear congressional or agency mandate. 160
Thus, the only permissible judicial inquiry is whether a particular state
provision falls within the established scope of preemption.
1. The Hazard Communication Standard
In enacting the OSH Act, Congress manifested an intent to preempt all
state and local laws "relating to" an occupational safety and health issue
for which OSHA has promulgated a federal standard. 16 1 OSHA simi-
larly intended the Hazard Communication Standard to preempt state
and local laws relating to the issue of hazard evaluation and communica-
155. Id. at 115, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2897 (House En-
ergy and Commerce Co.amittee).
156. Se gcnerally id., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 2835; H.R. REI'.
No 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3124
H R, Ri P, No. 962. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 183, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3124: supra note 108 and accompanying text.
157, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (presumption that Congress aware of settled judi-
cial construction), reh'g denied, 335 U.S. 836 (1948).
158. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 736 (3d Cir. 1985) (OSHA
Standard preempts New Jersey right-to-know law "with respect to disclosure to employees in the
manufacturing sector").
159. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
160 See \upra note 23 and accompanying text. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-26, at 483
n8
16l. See upra note 32 and accompanying text.
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tion. t6 2 OSHA's promulgation of the standard and its decision to pre-
empt state and local law fall squarely within the scope of congressionally
delegated authority. Courts, therefore, must uphold OSHA's adminis-
trative determination regarding the extent to which the OSHA Standard
preempts state and local law. 16 3
When OSHA revised the OSHA Standard, the agency more clearly
defined its preemptive scope. OSHA indicated that the standard
preempts all state and local laws whose primary purpose is hazard evalu-
ation and communication to workers."6 The agency thus expressly sanc-
tioned the Third Circuit's primary purpose test in the administrative
history. However, because the'agency's primary purpose language does
not appear in the standard's preemption clause,' 65 the ultimate inquiry
remains whether a state provision relates to-or "pertains to"-hazard
evaluation or communication to workers. While a state legislature's pri-
mary purpose in adopting right-to-know requirements may be one indi-
cation whether the provision relates to employee hazard communication,
federal preemption under the standard's terms is not expressly limited to
provisions whose primary purpose is worker health and safety.
Although OSHA sanctioned the use of a primary purpose analysis, its
version of the test is different than the Third Circuit's application. That
circuit court in Hughey I and Knepper ignored Congress' and OSHA's
intent that the OSHA Standard have a broad preemptive effect. These
decisions accepted as a primary purpose any goal "other than" or
"broader than" hazard communication to workers.' 66 In Knepper, the
Third Circuit further stretched the meaning of primary purpose by vali-
dating any state provision that merely "facilitate[d] compliance with" a
nonoccupational provision."' This indeterminate application of the
term "primary" removes dual purpose laws from the scope of federal
preemption. 16 Under such a bootstrapping rationale, states may avoid
federal preemption simply by attaching an environmental nexus in any
162. See supra note 51.
163. See supra notes 29, 55 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 116.
166. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. See generally notes 71-73 and accompanying
text.
167. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
168. This assumes that, under the nonoccupational purpose, the provision is not otherwise pre-
empted by federal law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/4
PREEMPTION OF RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS
way relating occupational health and safety to its right-to-know
provisions.
In response to the court of appeals decisions, OSHA redefined the is-
sue of hazard evaluation and communication. The agency specifically
included within the standard's scope hazardous substance lists, material
safety data sheets, and labeling provisions.169 Although OSHA did not
mandate the preemption of parallel state provisions, the definition is sig-
nificant in light of the agency's knowledge of the Hughey I and Knepper
opinions.' The revised OSHA Standard thus represents the agency's
partial disagreement with the Third Circuit's application of the primary
purpose test.
In addition to OSHA's reworking of the primary purpose test, the ex-
tension of the OSHA Standard to nonmanufacturing employers signifi-
cantly broadens the standard's effect on state and local laws. The
standard now regulates workplace hazard evaluation and communication
in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. 7 ' Thus, the
OSHA Standard preempts all state and local provisions relating to occu-
pational hazard evaluation and communication. The primary purpose of
a state regulatory provision merely indicates whether it pertains to haz-
ard evaluation or communication in the workplace.
2. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
EPCRA's broad antipreemption clause shields from preemption all
state and local laws.' 7 2 Congress preempted only state and local MSDS
provisions requiring unreasonable or burdensome information not re-
quired under the OSHA Standard.' 73 While EPCRA evidences congres-
sional acceptance of state community right-to-know laws, it provides
little guidance for determining what constitutes a community right-to-
know provision. Although EPCRA appears consistent with the holdings
in Hughey 1, Knepper, and Akron,'7 4 there is no indication that Congress
was aware of this judicial action.' 75 Because EPCRA was enacted so
close to the timing of these decisions, t1 6 the ordinary presumption that
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (1988). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
170, See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
171 29 C.F.R. § 1910,1200(b) (1988). See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
172 42 U.S.C. § 11,041(a) (Supp. V 1987) See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
173. Sec supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 60-96 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
176 Although Congress enacted EPCRA after the decision in Hughey I and just prior to the
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Congress knew of the judicial action is inappropriate.177 Thus, enact-
ment of EPCRA does not necessarily sanction use of the primary pur-
pose test.
EPCRA must be interpreted in light of the OSHA Standard it comple-
ments. 178 Congress expressly preserved only those state and local stat-
utes that the standard did not otherwise preempt. Courts should
therefore defer to OSHA's explicit definition of hazard evaluation and
communication to determine the validity of state and local right-to-know
provisions. 17
9
B. Implied Preemption
1. The Hazard Communication Standard
The expansion of the OSHA Standard to nonmanufacturing employers
affects the issue of implied preemption. The breadth of the standard's
express preemptive effect 180 suggests that the question of implied pre-
emption of state workplace hazard regulations should not arise. How-
ever, as states and localities retain jurisdiction over community right-to-
know regulation under EPCRA, implied preemption of these provisions
by the OSHA Standard will play a more significant role.
If a state community right-to-know provision renders compliance with
the federal standard impossible, state law must yield.' 8 ' Impossibility,
however, is difficult to establish. For instance, none of the New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, or Akron provisions would be invalid under this theory. '8 2
The OSHA Standard will have a greater preemptive effect on state and
decisions in Knepper and Akron, most of EPCRA's legislative history arose before the Third and
Sixth Circuit developments. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Congress knew of the
Third Circuit's decision in United Steelworkers of.Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1985), which
invalidated state worker right-to-know provisions in the manufacturing sector. See supra note 113.
Thus, Congress must have foreseen the OSHA Standard's inevitable expansion to the nonmanufac-
turing sector, which the Third Circuit ordered in 1985. See id.; supra notes 158-59 and accompany-
ing text.
177. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
179. OSHA's definition of worker hazard communication and evaluation aids in setting the pa-
rameters of community right-to-know. The federal standard necessarily does not expressly preempt
provisions falling beyond OSHA's explicit definition.
180. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
182. The Third Circuit found no implied preemption in Hughey I, Hughey II, or Knepper. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to address the implied
preemption issue. See generally supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
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local provisions that thwart the federal goal of protecting employees.183
As the Third Circuit indicated, however, a regulatory burden alone does
not constitute preemption.' 84 Although Congress and OSHA obviously
found some burden on employers acceptable, 8 5 a comprehensive federal
hazard communication scheme necessitates the implied preemption of
overly burdensome state laws. Even state plans approved by the Secre-
tary of Labor may not unduly interfere with interstate commerce. 1
86
The implied preemption analysis set forth in Hughey 11187 nearly fore-
closes the possibility of a court finding implied preemption. Under the
Third Circuit's reasoning in that decision, no burden on employees con-
stitutes an obstacle to the federal scheme if employers can lessen the bur-
den through remedial measures.' 88 Hughey II's rationale does not
address whether a state law interferes with achievement of federal goals,
but whether specific persons subject to the law might comply in a manner
that reduces interference.'89 For example, after Hughey II, the extent to
which New Jersey's universal labeling requirements impede OSHA's la-
beling system will vary greatly with the ability or willingness of each
employer to train employees or design more effective labeling
methods.'" 0
2. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
Congress clearly contemplated that some state and local right-to-know
laws would hamper the effectiveness of the federal hazard communi-
cation structure. Although Congress' primary concern in enacting
EPCRA was community health and safety, the legislative history of
EPCRA demonstrates a generally recognized need for uniform and com-
183. Se supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text.
184. See zupra note 99 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
18W. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. In explaining the interstate commerce issue in
preemption analysis, one commentator stated that "[t]he validity of state action affecting interstate
commerce must be judged in light of the desirability of permitting diverse responses to local needs
and the undesirability of permitting local interference with such uniformity as the unimpeded flow of
interstatc commerce may require." L TRIBE. supra note 19, § 6-4, at 407.
187. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 107.
189. Id
190. See id. Cf California Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987) (even if
California law requiring employer to provide favorable benefits to pregnant women conflicts with
Title VII, law not preempted because '[e]mployers are free to give comparable benefits to other
disabled employees") (alternative holding).
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prehensive federal regulation.' 9 ' Congress expected EPCRA to regulate
in tandem with the OSHA Standard. '92 Thus, any state or local commu-
nity right-to-know provision that renders compliance with the federal
scheme impossible or frustrates its effectiveness must yield to federal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
OSHA's amendment of its Hazard Communication Standard signifi-
cantly broadened preemption of state and local worker right-to-know
laws. Congress, however, expressly preserved nonfederal community
right-to-know laws in EPCRA. Both changes call for a stricter applica-
tion of the primary purpose test and greater deference to congressional
and administrative intent than that announced by the Third Circuit in
Hughey I, Knepper, and Hughey II. Moreover, the primary purpose test
ignores the dual function of many state and local provisions. The Sixth
Circuit's deference in Akron is more consistent with the appropriate pre-
emption analysis that the amended OSHA Standard and EPCRA
necessitate.
Portia C. Smith
191. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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